Iran’s central bank warns economy may take 12 years to rebuild after war

The blockade, targeting Iranian ports and imposing partial restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, took effect at 10 a.m. Eastern Time.

Iran’s heavy reliance on southern shipping lanes leaves its economy exposed to maritime disruption, with more than 90% of its $109.7 billion annual trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

The blockade is expected to cut off nearly all of Iran’s seaborne trade, wiping out an estimated $435 million in daily economic activity and forcing oil field shutdowns within weeks.

A blockade would effectively zero out Iran’s export revenues within days and trigger cascading effects across its financial system.

Oil exports would be hit first

Crude oil shipments would be the first and most severe casualty. Iran has been exporting roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, generating about $139 million daily based on wartime pricing assumptions.

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  Iran keeps oil flowing to China as Hormuz pressure forces reserve release

Nearly all of that volume departs via Kharg Island, which handles over 90% of crude exports and lacks viable alternative routes outside the Persian Gulf.

A blockade would eliminate these flows almost immediately, cutting off the Islamic Republic’s primary source of foreign currency earnings.

Petrochemicals and non-oil trade

Petrochemical exports, valued at roughly $54 million per day based on recent trade data, would also be halted. Facilities at Assaluyeh, Imam Khomeini, and Shahid Rajaei ports all sit within the Persian Gulf and depend on uninterrupted maritime access.

Non-oil exports – including minerals and metals – would see similar disruption. Of approximately $88 million in daily shipments, around 90% would be blocked, removing another $79 million a day in revenue.

Ports play a central role in this vulnerability. Shahid Rajaei alone handles more than half of Iran’s cargo operations, while Imam Khomeini is a key entry point for basic goods imports.

Bushehr ports handled about 57 million tons of cargo last year, underscoring how deeply Iran’s trade is concentrated in southern waters.

Limited alternatives beyond the region

Efforts to develop alternative export routes appear insufficient to offset losses.

The Jask terminal, designed as a bypass to Hormuz, operates far below its intended capacity, with effective throughput estimated at around 70,000 barrels per day.

Chabahar port and Caspian Sea facilities handle only a fraction of the volumes moved through Persian Gulf ports.

Combined, these routes could replace less than 10% of current volumes.

Imports and inflation pressures intensify

On the import side, Iran brings in about $159 million in goods daily, including industrial inputs, machinery, and food.

Disruptions to these flows would likely accelerate inflation, which has already surged. Food prices have risen sharply, with staple items such as rice increasing up to sevenfold in recent months.

Any interruption to imports would deepen supply shortages and place further strain on household purchasing power.

Storage limits create shutdown risk

A critical constraint lies in Iran’s oil storage capacity.

Iran has approximately 50–55 million barrels of onshore oil storage capacity, about 60% of which is already filled. Spare capacity stands at around 20 million barrels.

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  Iran shields its oil exports as Hormuz flows falter

With surplus production of 1.5 million barrels per day that is normally exported, this capacity would be filled in about 13 days. After that, Iran would be forced to shut in oil wells.

This is highly significant because when mature oil wells are shut, water from below can intrude into the reservoir – a process known as “water coning.”

In this situation, some of the oil becomes permanently trapped within rock pores and can no longer be recovered. Iran’s oil fields are already declining at a rate of 5–8% per year.

Forced shutdowns could permanently eliminate 300,000 to 500,000 barrels per day of production capacity – equivalent to $9–15 billion in annual revenue lost forever.

Currency faces renewed pressure

The loss of export revenues would also affect Iran’s currency markets.

The rial has already weakened sharply, trading near 1.6 million per dollar in unofficial markets, with inflation running close to 50%.

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A halt in foreign exchange inflows would likely intensify depreciation, further limit access to cash, and could push the currency toward hyperinflation.

Banks have already imposed withdrawal limits, reflecting existing financial strain.

Economic pressure builds rapidly

Taken together, the figures suggest a blockade would impose roughly $13 billion in monthly economic damage, combining export losses and disrupted imports.

Iran’s economic structure, heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf transit routes and energy exports, makes continued resistance economically impossible under the US naval blockade.

The figures show how quickly pressure could build if shipping lanes are closed, with immediate fiscal impacts followed by longer-term damage to production capacity and financial stability.

Across Iran’s political spectrum—from senior officials to hardline lawmakers—the failure of the 21-hour negotiations has been framed not as the end of talks but as a moment to test leverage, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz and Washington’s newly announced naval blockade.

Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, who was part of the Iranian delegation in Islamabad, placed responsibility for the breakdown squarely on Washington while leaving room for further engagement.

In a post on X, he wrote that distrust toward the United States stems from “the experiences of the previous two wars,” adding that Washington failed to convince Tehran while leaving open whether the Americans could “earn our trust.”

President Masoud Pezeshkian struck a softer tone, signaling conditional openness to diplomacy.

“If the American government abandons its totalitarianism and respects the rights of the Iranian nation, ways to reach an agreement will certainly be found,” he wrote on X.

All about Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly a fifth of global oil flows—has rapidly emerged as both a bargaining chip and a symbolic red line in Tehran’s messaging.

President Donald Trump announced a US naval blockade aimed at preventing vessels from entering or leaving Iranian ports and intercepting ships that pay transit fees to Tehran.

US Central Command said the blockade would begin Monday and apply to vessels of all nations calling at Iranian ports.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy warned that any escalation in the waterway could have severe consequences, cautioning that “any miscalculation will trap the enemy in deadly whirlpools in the strait.”

Hardline voices have increasingly framed control of the waterway as a source of revenue and national prestige.

“From now on… we will have a third source of income called the Strait of Hormuz,” lawmaker Amir-Hossein Sabeti said at a pro-government rally.

University professor and commentator Foad Izadi suggested in a post on X that future confrontation could transform the strait into Iran’s “most important source of income,” while hinting that alternative export routes could become targets.

‘Taboo broken’

Some Iranian analysts warn that the US blockade risks pushing both sides closer to military confrontation.

Political analyst Ruhollah Rahimpour described the move as “beating the drums of war,” arguing that Washington is effectively testing Iran’s economic lifeline.

“Iran’s economy is locked into the chokepoint of Hormuz, and now Trump has decided to test this lock with a hammer,” he said. “In such a situation, either the lock opens, or the whole door will be torn off.”

Reformist voices, however, emphasized the historic nature of the talks themselves.

Former lawmaker Mahmoud Sadeghi described the direct engagement as “a major taboo-breaking moment,” noting the significance of Iranian and American officials meeting at such a level after nearly half a century.

Journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi similarly argued that failure in Islamabad “does not mean a definite failure of diplomacy,” warning that a return to full-scale war would produce an “irreversible catastrophe for all parties.”

Former Vice President Mohammad-Ali Abtahi also struck a cautious tone, writing that “47 years of open hostility cannot be resolved in a few hours.

The delegation which held lengthy talks with the US team in Islamabad on Saturday includes not only Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and his political allies but also Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, Secretary of the Defence Council, and more moderate technocrats such as Central Bank of Iran Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati.

However, the presence of Mahmoud Nabavian—a hardline parliamentarian known for his staunch opposition to negotiations with the West—has generated particular surprise.

Nabavian, a cleric affiliated with the ultra-conservative Paydari (Steadfastness) Party, has for years denounced figures like Mohammad-Javad Zarif and the relatively moderate government of Hassan Rouhani as “traitors” for pursuing the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

His inclusion in the delegation appears to be interpreted as a calculated move by Ghalibaf. By bringing a vocal critic of negotiations into the process, he may be attempting to share responsibility for the outcome and pre-empt future criticism from hardline factions that wield significant influence within Iran’s political and military structures.

With figures like Nabavian involved, any eventual agreement—or failure to reach one— is less easily attributed to a single political camp.

According to political activist Hossein Shirzad, the delegation’s structure suggests a broader objective beyond traditional diplomacy. “The composition of the delegation … indicates that negotiations are aimed at presenting a ‘political business plan’ to Donald Trump’s representatives for Iran’s future,” he wrote on X. He added that “the discussions are likely about the quality of an agreement, not the agreement itself.”

Shirzad also claimed that “the issue has already been resolved behind the scenes. Ghalibaf wants to prove that he has the expertise and executive capability to manage Iran and control the remaining structure. He is seeking personal and factional guarantees.”

Mojtaba's green light

Despite the significance of the negotiations, Iran’s new supreme leader has not issued an explicit public endorsement.

However, in a written message marking the fortieth day after his father’s death, Mojtaba Khamenei referred to the “announcement of the decision to negotiate with the enemy” and called for public mobilization to influence the outcome, remarks that many interpret as implicit approval of the negotiation process.

He also referenced verses from Surah Al-Fath in the Quran, alluding to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah—a peace agreement between Prophet Muhammad and his adversaries in Mecca. In Islamic tradition, this treaty is seen as a strategic move that reduced conflict and ultimately strengthened Muslims despite their weaker position at the time.

Such symbolic references carry strong weight among the Islamic Republic’s ideological base.

Ghalibaf and his rivals in the conservative camp

Divisions and rivalry within Iran's conservative camp remain pronounced. On one side stands Ghalibaf and his pragmatic allies—often described as technocratic conservatives—who advocate negotiation from a position of strength. They reject ultimatums but view diplomacy as a rational tool for managing tensions and reducing external pressure, with indirect talks seen as the most viable path under current conditions.

For Ghalibaf, success in these talks could significantly bolster his political standing after multiple failed bids for the presidency over the past two decades. A diplomatic breakthrough could help secure his position as a leading figure in Iran’s future political landscape.

On the other side are more radical conservatives, including Saeed Jalili and factions such as the Paydari Party, who have consistently opposed any engagement with the United States. These groups have framed past agreements as “surrender” and continue to adopt a hardline stance.

Jalili has remained notably silent in recent days, fueling speculation in political circles that under the new leadership he may have been replaced in his role at the Supreme National Security Council by Ali Bagheri-Kani, also present alongside the delegation.

Hardline opposition beyond political elites

Hardline opposition extends beyond political elites into public discourse. In street protests and on social media, critics have condemned any potential agreement as a sign of “humiliation” and “betrayal of the leader’s blood.”

In one widely circulated video, a speaker denounced Ghalibaf’s trip to Pakistan for talks with JD Vance, prompting crowds to chant “Hayhat Min al-Dhilla” (“Never accept humiliation”)—a phrase historically attributed to Imam Hussain on the Day of Ashura.

State media also reflects this tension. While negotiations are widely understood to require leadership approval, some broadcasters have continued to voice dissent.

For instance, a presenter on IRGC-affiliated Ofogh TV questioned the rationale for talks, asking: “If the Zionist regime has violated the ceasefire, based on which commitment should we remain silent and go negotiate? Three of Iran’s ten conditions for negotiation have been violated.”

Even so, other voices within state media have pointed to historical precedents, noting that several Shia Imams engaged in dialogue or cooperation with their adversaries, suggesting that negotiation, in itself, is not incompatible with ideological principles.

Senior Iranian officials are locked in a dispute over the composition and authority of the delegation set to negotiate with the United States in Islamabad, sources with knowledge of the matter told Iran International.

IRGC commander-in-chief Ahmad Vahidi is seeking to curb the authority of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in the talks, according to the sources.

Vahidi has also pushed for the inclusion of Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, in the negotiating team — a move opposed by current members, who consider him lacking experience for strategic negotiations, the sources said.

At the same time, Vahidi and the IRGC Aerospace Force commander have stressed that the delegation must avoid any negotiations over Iran’s missile program.

The ceasefire announced on April 7 has offered temporary relief to the United States and, by extension, the global economy. Oil prices have since fallen below $100 per barrel, the Strait of Hormuz may finally reopen, and global stock markets have rallied, recovering part of the losses recorded over the previous 40 days.

The coming days may prove crucial for stabilizing seasonal supply chains, particularly for fertilizer inputs transiting the strait during the peak planting period in the Northern Hemisphere.

Inside Iran, however, the outlook is far more complex.

The war effectively froze Iran's economic crises, shuttered markets, and halted price discovery. A similar pattern followed the 12-day conflict earlier in the war, when markets closed temporarily before reopening to renewed upward pressure as underlying imbalances reasserted themselves. This time, the damage is far greater.

During US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s strategic infrastructure, attacks on Mahshahr and Asaluyeh petrochemical facilities hit sites Iranian officials say account for 85% of the country’s petrochemical export capacity.

The steel industry was also hit. Since these sectors supply downstream industries from plastics to automotive manufacturing and construction, the full scale of disruption has yet to be assessed.

The Tehran Stock Exchange has been closed for more than 40 consecutive days.

The head of the Securities and Exchange Organization has indicated that war-damaged companies will return to trading at a later stage, meaning that even if the exchange reopens, a significant portion of major firms may remain inactive.

Reopening without viable export-oriented companies could trigger heavy selling pressure in a market where banks and automakers are already loss-making and reliant on state support.

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Inflation remains the most pressing crisis. Before the US-Israeli airstrikes, annual inflation had surpassed 70 percent — the highest since World War II. Food inflation reached triple digits, with bread and grains rising by 140 percent and cooking oil by more than 200 percent.

The war temporarily suppressed these pressures: demand fell amid unemployment, banking disruptions reduced the velocity of money, and property and automobile transactions slowed sharply.

With the Pakistani-brokered ceasefire, that suppressed demand is likely to return.

The fiscal picture offers no relief. The approved budget included a 65-percent rise in taxes, but roughly 60 percent of working-age individuals are currently unemployed.

In effect, the government is attempting to tax its way out of a fiscal crisis in an economy where the majority of working-age adults have no income to tax. Post-war military expenditures and reconstruction obligations have increased sharply, with no significant new revenue streams available.

Compounding this is the disruption of Iran's primary financial channel through Dubai, which for years served as a central hub for trade and currency transactions worth $16 billion to $28 billion annually.

Following recent attacks on Dubai, Emirati authorities reportedly detained dozens of currency dealers linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guard and shut down associated front companies.

Alternative channels in Herat and Erbil remain active but lack Dubai's scale. When suppressed demand for foreign currency returns, it will hit a narrower, less efficient set of channels, amplifying exchange rate volatility.

The ceasefire offered the world a reprieve. For Iran, it removed the only thing suppressing a crisis that had been building for months. When markets reopen, they will price in not only pre-war imbalances but the destruction of the export capacity that once generated foreign currency.

The rial will face a market that has every reason to reprice it sharply downward, and a state with fewer tools than ever to intervene. Iran's economy has not returned to its pre-war condition. It has moved past it.

Yet the ceasefire itself is fragile, reportedly violated several times within its first 48 hours. Even in the best-case diplomatic scenario, the technology and capital required for reconstruction will not materialize within weeks, and as long as the risk of renewed conflict remains, investors are unlikely to commit long-term capital.

What comes next at the negotiating table will shape whether any of it matters.