Iran seizes assets to punish dissent

After the loss of longtime Russian allies Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, the Kremlin can hardly wish to suffer further loss of an ally in Tehran.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may yet remain in power—thanks partly to ongoing Russian-Iranian cooperation. But even if he does not, Vladimir Putin may still be able to salvage the situation.

Moscow, according to an analysis by the Carnegie Endowment, does not seem likely to intervene militarily in Iran to defend the Islamic Republic against its opponents. Russian forces, after all, are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine.

Yet, as detailed in an article in Foreign Policy, Moscow has long provided Tehran with electronic and other tools of repression. Since the Iranian demonstrators are not an armed opposition, Russian military intervention may not be needed to contain or suppress the unrest.

The situation might change, of course, if US president Donald Trump follows through on his threats to intervene in Iran. Both Tehran and Moscow want to avoid this. But how?

While Putin himself has been remarkably quiet about events in Iran, the one initiative Russia has engaged in so far is mediation between Iran and Israel. Both governments have reportedly conveyed to Moscow that neither will preemptively attack the other.

This Russian mediation effort may be highly important for protecting the Islamic Republic. Unlike just before and during the June 2025 twelve-day war—when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was urging the United States to join attacks on Iran—Netanyahu is now reportedly counseling restraint in Washington regarding military intervention.

While Israel has long opposed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Netanyahu may prefer that a weakened Islamic Republic remain in power rather than be overthrown and replaced by either a more hostile regime, or one more closely aligned with the West in ways Israel cannot shape.

Netanyahu has already found himself at cross-purposes with Trump over Syria, where the United States has sought to cooperate with the new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, while Israel views the government in Damascus as a threat.

Moscow’s coordination with Israel may therefore increase Putin’s ability to dissuade Trump from intervening in Iran.

For Moscow, the best outcome in the current crisis is that the Islamic Republic defeats its internal opponents and survives. But Russia may still retain significant influence and cooperation with Iran after a change in leadership—or even regime.

In Syria, Moscow has kept its naval and air bases despite the fall of Assad. In Venezuela, Russia has moved quickly to re-engage with the post-Maduro authorities, seeking to preserve economic and strategic ties despite a major political rupture.

If Khamenei falls but the Islamic Republic remains intact, Tehran is likely to continue cooperating with Russia despite any newfound willingness to work with the United States.

Even if the Islamic Republic collapses, its replacement will almost certainly continue to envision Iran as a regional great power.

A new Iranian government may pursue more cooperative relations with Washington while still seeking ties with Russia, China, and others—much as new leaderships elsewhere have attempted to diversify their external partnerships.

Moscow, for its part, will actively seek cooperation with any new authorities in Tehran to prevent Iran from becoming overly dependent on the West.

With regard to Ukraine, Putin has shown little flexibility, pressing ahead despite extraordinary human and financial costs. But when it comes to supporting anti-Western allies in the Global South, Moscow has been more pragmatic.

The demands of the war in Ukraine limit Russia’s ability to defend embattled partners elsewhere, while Putin’s long-standing efforts to cultivate relations with traditionally pro-Western governments have reduced the strategic necessity of rigid ideological allies.

It is undoubtedly embarrassing for Moscow to see longtime partners fall from power, but this is hardly unique to Russia—as the collapse of the Western-backed government in Afghanistan demonstrated.

Putin appears to understand that the downfall of any government in the Global South is typically followed by competition among outside powers for influence. This is not a moment to lament losses, but to adapt—to engage new leaders eager to keep their options open rather than rely on a single great-power patron.

Moscow’s preferred outcome in Iran remains the survival of the Islamic Republic and the continuation of close cooperation. But if leadership—or even regime—change occurs, Russia will move quickly to adjust.

If Putin’s success in retaining Russian bases in Syria despite backing the losing side is any guide, he may well succeed in doing so in Iran as well.

Mai Sato said earlier this week that civilian deaths were estimated at 5,000 or more, adding that medical reports suggested the toll could be far higher, at about 20,000 or more.

The US-based Human Rights Activist News Agency (HRANA) said it has verified 4,902 deaths since unrest erupted in late December and is reviewing a further 9,387 suspected fatalities, while more than 26,000 people have been arrested, according to a statement on its website.

Iran’s National Security Council on Wednesday issued its first official toll, reporting 3,117 deaths, including 2,427 described as “innocent,” among them members of the security forces, without providing a civilian breakdown.

Iran International reported earlier this month that more than 12,000 people were killed during the crackdown largely on January 8 and 9.

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  At least 12,000 killed in Iran crackdown during internet blackout

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  Iran crackdown left 16,500 dead, 330,000 injured - Sunday Times

"Iran held five journalists as of December 1, down from a peak of 55 three years earlier, but has generated the highest number of documented torture and beating cases against imprisoned media workers since records began in 1992," CPJ’s 2025 global prison census published on Wednesday said.

The report said Iran’s record worsened following nationwide protests, with journalists frequently detained for covering demonstrations and dissent.

CPJ links Iran’s earlier spike in journalist jailing to nationwide protests in recent years, and rights groups say reporters have been repeatedly detained for covering demonstrations and dissent.

Rights groups also report that many of those detained have been held in notorious facilities such as Tehran’s Evin Prison under harsh conditions.

Iran has been under a near-total internet and telecommunications blackout since early January amid nationwide protests, severely restricting the flow of information from inside the country.

Internet monitoring groups including NetBlocks recorded sharp drops in connectivity across Iran as authorities sought to limit access to social media, messaging services and independent news coverage.

The Middle East and North Africa remains the region with the third-highest number of jailed journalists worldwide. CPJ said Iran is among several states where authorities routinely treat critical reporting as a security threat, using broadly defined anti-state or terrorism-related accusations to justify arrests.

The report warned that Iran continues to arrest reporters, particularly those covering protests and economic grievances. Detainees face harsh conditions, prolonged pre-trial detention and due-process violations in breach of international law, the organization said.

It said the global trend of jailing and mistreating journalists in countries including Iran not only reflects authoritarian governance but also enables corruption and abuse of power by shielding them from public scrutiny.

Through sporadic messages, rare phone calls and accounts relayed to media outlets operating outside the country, details are surfacing of civilians shot during nationwide protests that erupted earlier this month and were met with what sources describe as one of the deadliest crackdowns in the Islamic Republic in decades.

Among the cases now coming to light is the killing of a shopkeeper in the southern city of Shiraz, according to people familiar with the incident who spoke to Iran International.

Local sources said the man had sheltered protesters inside his business during demonstrations on January 8.

The shop owner, identified as Gholamreza Zareh, ran the Linda flower shop on Qadamgah Street. Witnesses said that after protesters had fled, Zareh later opened his door to assess whether the security presence had subsided. Security forces then shot him in the neck, killing him instantly, according to the accounts.

The fate of the protesters who had sought refuge in the shop remains unclear.

In a separate incident in the southwestern city of Andimeshk, a 19-year-old protester, Shahab Fallahpour, was killed by security forces during demonstrations, people familiar with the case told Iran International.

Sources said Fallahpour, a wrestler from the Shohada neighborhood, was shot on January 9 by sniper fire from a rooftop on Parto Street, without warning. His body was buried three days later, before dawn on January 12, in the presence of his parents and under the supervision of government forces, according to the accounts.

No funeral ceremony was permitted, and the family has since been pressured not to speak publicly, the sources said.

Iran International has reported that at least 12,000 people have been killed since the protests began. CBS News has cited estimates placing the death toll as high as 20,000.

Sources told Iran International on Wednesday that hospitals and morgues are facing shortages of body bags, resulting in bodies being stored in corridors and other areas.

They described heavy security deployments at medical facilities, restrictions on families’ access, and limits on the registration of information related to the dead, which they said appeared aimed at preventing the true scale of the killings from becoming public.

With communications still largely severed, the full extent of what has occurred across Iran may not be known for weeks, if ever.

For more than a year, Iranian political analysts, sociologists and even establishment insiders had warned that mounting economic pressure and social exhaustion were pushing the country toward a nationwide rupture.

The state, unable or unwilling to pursue reform, appeared to place its faith instead in a familiar instrument: brute force.

When unrest finally broke out, it was met with an exceptionally violent crackdown that claimed thousands of lives. The predictions came true in the worst possible way.

‘Boiling point’

In October 2025, former labor minister and government spokesman Ali Rabiei wrote in the reformist daily Sharq that Iranians were “fed up with the government’s promises.” Without meaningful economic relief, he warned, the country risked sliding into civil unrest.

A month later, sociologist Taghi Azad Armaki described the situation as “critical,” calling for national dialogue rather than denial. Accumulated social dissatisfaction, he told the moderate daily Etemad, had pushed society to its “boiling point.”

Moderate commentator Abbas Abdi went further weeks later, writing in Etemad that Iranian society had reached “the point of no return.”

State-affiliated news agencies — including Revolutionary Guards-linked Fars — did highlight economic grievances, but largely downplayed the likelihood of widespread protest, framing any potential unrest as the work of foreign actors.

A crisis mapped in advance

The clearest articulation of what lay ahead came in late December 2025, just as protests were beginning to spread and foreign-exchange and gold prices were surging.

Writing for the reformist website Rouydad24, analyst Amir Dabiri Mehr argued that Iran’s fate now hinged almost entirely on how the government chose to respond. He outlined four possible scenarios, ranging from de-escalation to catastrophe.

In the first two — economic reform or restraint by security forces — the government would seek to calm public anger without violence. Dabiri Mehr treated both as increasingly unlikely. Events soon confirmed that assessment.

The third scenario, a violent crackdown, did unfold. Security forces suppressed protests across cities including Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and Rasht, temporarily silencing dissent through force.

Ignoring it all

Dabiri Mehr’s fourth scenario envisioned escalation: a severe crackdown combined with the portrayal of protesters as “enemies” or “foreign agents,” pushing unrest toward militarization and raising the risk of foreign intervention or broader confrontation.

He cautioned that a social media blackout would not contain anger but displace it — forcing dissent from online spaces into the streets and transforming economic frustration into a wider social movement. Repression alone, he warned at the time, would not resolve the crisis.

The tragedy now unfolding was foreseen not only by contemporary analysts but, metaphorically, by Iran’s own literary tradition.

In Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, written a millennium ago, a line captures the logic of the present moment: When a man’s fortune darkens, he does everything he should not do.

The warnings were clear. The alternatives were understood. What followed was not inevitability, but choice—and its consequences are now unfolding.