Top Khamenei adviser floats reform to appease public after Israel war

“The issue with Trump and Netanyahu is not assassination, but the implementation of justice,” Kayhan wrote Wednesday, also referring to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview with Fox News on Tuesday that the Islamic Republic does not seek to kill anybody abroad.

"This is not our policy to kill anybody outside Iran, let alone the president of another country," he said, though clerics have issued fatwas calling for his death.

A hardline Iranian cleric close to Iran’s Supreme Leader called on Muslims to kill US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in June in response to their threats against Khamenei.

The call came days after Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi and Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani issued separate fatwas against Trump and Netanyahu.

Shirazi said in his statement: “Any regime or individual threatening the leaders of the Islamic Ummah (nation) and acting on those threats qualifies as a mohareb.”

Kayhan described both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as corruptors on earth and mohareb (enemy of God), terms which if invoked in fatwas or decrees under Shi'ite jurisprudence make it religiously obligatory for devout Shi'ite Muslims to act.

The penalty for the crimes in the Islamic Republic's theocratic system is death.

Kayhan also denounced Araghchi’s comment that “this has never been Iran’s policy to wipe out Israel from the map,” calling the comment “against the country’s official and strategic positions.”

The paper cited statements by the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ruhollah Khomeini, who said Israel “must vanish from the page of time,” as well as Khamenei’s 2015 vow that “Israel will not see the next 25 years.”

100%

The backlash follows criticism from the Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Fars News Agency, which said Araghchi’s recent remarks admitting damage to the country's nuclear facilities and enrichment risked projecting weakness in the wake of the war with Israel.

“Our facilities have been damaged – seriously damaged,” Araghchi said in his interview after US strikes on the country's three main facilities were said to have "obliterated" Iran's nuclear program, according to Trump. “The extent of which is now under evaluation … enrichment has currently ceased."

Fars also faulted him for dismissing clerical fatwas targeting Trump, saying that to deny it undermines national resolve.

In January, Iran's President, Masoud Pezeshkian, said that Iran “never attempted” to kill Trump, “and we never will.”

Images of former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani meeting Russia’s President Vladimir Putin emerged without prior notice on Sunday, shortly after a separate encounter between Putin and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

The hardline daily Javan, affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, reported the visit on Monday and questioned its goals and timing.

“It may have been a force majeure meeting—urgent and unpredictable,” an editorial read. “The urgency could stem from last-minute coordination on US and Israeli aggression against Iran, the nuclear dossier, the Gaza crisis and the faltering talks with the European troika.”

Javan dismissed the possibility that arms deals were on the agenda, noting that Moscow has offered only tepid support in recent conflicts despite being “indebted to Iran for undermining American hegemony.”

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei asserted on Monday that Larijani met Putin as a representative of Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian.

But the very need for clarification may be seen as confirmation of what many in Tehran already believe: Pezeshkian is not a key player in foreign policy, and important messages are conveyed by Khamenei’s aides rather than diplomats.

Signs of a comeback?

Larijani’s sudden appearance alongside Putin was seen by some pundits as a signal that the former parliament speaker might be “back” after a spell out of spotlight.

Vahideh Karimi, political editor of the reformist Sharq, analyzed Larijani’s evolving role. She noted he seized the 12-day war with Israel as an opportunity to reposition himself.

“Larijani knows the corridors of power in Tehran and is widely regarded as a moderate figure well-versed in negotiation,” she wrote.

Once a staunch conservative, Larijani aligned with former President Hassan Rouhani to tap into reformist popularity—a shift reportedly frowned upon by Khamenei, who later barred him from the presidential race.

Since the war, Larijani has returned to more conservative positions. Karimi argues that his Revolutionary Guard background, pragmatic ambiguity and rhetorical agility make him uniquely suited to the current moment.

‘Calculated ambiguity’

The timing of Larijani’s visit to Russia appears strategic. With high-stakes negotiations underway over Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran may have sought counsel from Moscow—its most powerful regional ally.

Karimi also pointed to Larijani’s increased engagement in religious circles as a calculated move to court conservative backing. Still, she warned that Iran’s hardliners—suspicious of independent operators—could once again block his ascent.

Yet Larijani’s key asset, she added, lies in his ambiguity: neither fully beholden to any faction nor entirely obedient, a trait that resonates with many Iranians.

Karimi said the Moscow meeting reflects both Khamenei’s trust in Larijani and possible backing for a future leadership role.

The uproar began after the quiet release of a vaguely worded by-law from the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), calling for a committee be established to protect online businesses from “unlawful or arbitrary interference.”

Many Iranians interpreted it as a gateway to grant faster, less filtered internet to favored groups—especially those linked to the government or commercial sectors.

“Tiered internet—no matter what deceptive name it hides behind—is a clear injustice against the Iranian people,” outspoken IT professor Ali Sharifi Zarchi posted on X.

The skepticism stems from years of worsening digital repression: Iran consistently ranks among the lowest in the world for internet freedom, and a de facto tiered system already exists, with officials and state insiders enjoying full access to platforms like X that are officially banned for the general public.

“Accepting class-based internet means accepting a worse internet for ‘the other’, said digital educator and influencer Amir Emad Mirmirani - widely known as Jadi.

"It means one day they’ll say: ‘You work for that publication? Then you don’t qualify.’ Or ‘You took that position back then? Then you’re excluded,’” Jadi posted on X.

'Actions not words'

President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had pledged to expand digital access during his campaign, sought to calm public anger.

“Access to free information is a right for all citizens, not a privilege for a select few. The government is obligated and determined to provide free, high-quality, and inclusive internet,” he posted on X on July 16.

But his statement—delivered via a presumably unrestricted connection—was met with skepticism.

“The president and his spokesperson came on Twitter using the unfiltered internet reserved for officials to say they’re against class-based internet,” Jadi quipped in another post.

University lecturer Shiva Arashteh was more direct: “You can’t oppose (unequal access) and sign a by-law that grants privileges to certain groups. Your words and actions are far apart.”

Facilitating repression?

The authority issuing the controversial directive, the SCC, is formally chaired by the president but is dominated by personnel appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and officials from conservative institutions, including the Revolutionary Guards and the Organization for Islamic Propagation.

As a result, the president and his cabinet hold little sway in shaping internet policy, despite chairing the body on paper.

Entrepreneurs and educators warn of deeper consequences.

“The survival of a business depends on customer acquisition, and a very large portion of our marketing activities and traffic are conducted on filtered or restricted platforms,” said entrepreneur Alireza Ghanadan.

Civil society groups and technologists say the infrastructure for discriminatory access is already in place.

During prior state-imposed shutdowns, government agencies, state media and affiliated users reportedly maintained access to platforms like WhatsApp, Instagram and Google, while the broader population went dark.

According to the UN International Organization for Migration, nearly 700,000 Afghans were deported from Iran in the first half of 2025. A full 130,000 were expelled within just one week after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel. Many had lived in Iran for decades.

Far from an aberration, the recent wave of arrests, public humiliation and mass expulsions of Afghan migrants is a continuation of Tehran's decades-old political manipulation of one of the most vulnerable populations in the region.

The Islamic Republic's founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini famously declared that "Islam has no borders" and welcomed Afghan refugees fleeing a Soviet invasion in 1979.

But beyond this ideological gesture, Tehran never offered a clear legal or humanitarian framework for integration. Millions of Afghans entered Iran, only to be denied citizenship, legal employment or access to education and healthcare.

Over the decades, Afghan migrants have been treated as expendable tools in Tehran’s shifting policies in the region.

They were recruited to fight in Syria as part of the “Fatemiyoun” Brigade, exploited as cheap undocumented labor inside Iran and periodically threatened with mass expulsion in bouts of official populism.

100%

During moments of domestic discontent, Afghan migrants became convenient targets to deflect public anger.

Under President Ebrahim Raisi, the policy of exploitation took on new dimensions. In the wake of the Taliban's return to power in 2021, a massive influx of Afghan refugees entered Iran and as many as around two million Afghans crossed the border within two years.

Rather than developing a comprehensive migration policy, Tehran allowed its border regions to turn into chaotic transit points run by smugglers and corrupt officials.

Xenophobia

In the aftermath of Israel’s devastating strikes on Iranian military and nuclear sites, domestic frustration reached boiling point.

The Islamic Republic, seeking to redirect the public's discontent, amplified xenophobic narratives portraying Afghans as a threat to national security.

Despite isolated claims of rising crime among Afghans, official figures show otherwise.

Iran's judiciary reports that Afghan nationals comprise only about 6% of the prison population—roughly in line with their proportion of the total population. The majority of these arrests are for undocumented entry or labor violations, not violent or organized crime.

100%

Ghosts of policies past

In 2001, following the fall of the Taliban, I traveled to the border town of Taybad and the nearby Islam Qala crossing and I was able to personally witness the brutal consequences of this policy.

There, I saw mass graves of Hazara refugees who had been forcibly returned by the Islamic Republic and summarily executed by Taliban fighters in the deserts surrounding the town.

Tehran knew that these Shia Hazaras were at extreme risk, yet still arrested them in Iranian cities, detained them in camps in the east and deported them into the hands of their eventual killers. This memory haunts me to this day.

The recent expulsions have also generated heartbreaking testimonies. Haajar Shademani, a 19-year-old Afghan born in Shiraz, told AFP she was forced to leave the only home she ever knew.

Denied access to Iranian universities and now blocked from education under Taliban rule, she faces an uncertain future.

100%

The Islamic Republic’s interference in Afghanistan has extended far beyond its borders. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), through its Ansar Corps based in eastern Iran, has pursued an interventionist policy in Afghan affairs.

Military and intelligence advisors operated on the ground while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a dedicated Afghanistan Affairs Office, often in conflict with the IRGC’s goals.

These interventions disrupted Afghanistan’s internal balance and forced thousands more civilians to flee.

Moreover, Tehran deliberately resettled the families of Afghan political and military elites inside Iran, creating dependencies that undermined Afghan sovereignty.

This too was part of a broader strategy: open-door policies were never humanitarian in intent—they were designed to serve Iran’s strategic interests.

As Tehran continues to wage psychological warfare against Afghan migrants, reports of mob violence, arson, and public beatings have become more frequent.

In this climate of state-sanctioned hostility, ultra-conservative media figures portray any defense of Afghan rights as treason.

Policymakers and human rights advocates in Washington and European capitals should call out Tehran's exploitation of Afghan refugees.

This community is not a plaything—Afghans are survivors of a conflict-plagued country, and their dignity must not be sacrificed for political expediency.

Afghan migrants deserve justice, protection, and the chance to live free from fear—not another generation of displacement and death.

Following the recent twelve-day war with Israel, many Iranians are asking: What truly happened? Where do we stand now? And what is the realistic path forward?

Prevailing narratives misdiagnose the crisis. They fall into three categories:

The government’s narrative casts Iran as victorious. Yet the facts suggest otherwise.

Iran suffered serious losses: senior military figures were killed, defense systems degraded, and critical parts of its nuclear and missile infrastructure were hit. In return, Iran’s retaliatory strikes did not shift the balance.

Misrepresenting this as triumph only reinforces poor decisions.

Regime-change advocates imagine foreign military pressure will fracture Iran’s security apparatus and cause collapse. But this view underestimates the cohesion of Iran’s coercive institutions and the self-interest of foreign powers, who are unlikely to commit to regime change.

The assumption that mass defections would yield democratic transition lacks grounding.

Structuralist perspectives also misplace blame.

One variant cites imperialism and calls for confrontation with the West. Another urges nuclear armament to balance power. But both ignore domestic dysfunction and corruption, and the risks of pursuing nuclear weapons now.

National strength requires more than deterrence—it needs capable, legitimate governance.

Understanding the crisis

The Islamic Republic has become a driver of national weakness. Two trends define this: a confrontational US posture and a disrupted power balance weakening Iran.

Decades of mistrust between Tehran and Washington—rooted in the 1953 coup and 1979 hostage crisis—have been worsened by missed diplomatic openings.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei consistently rejected efforts by moderate president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and others to improve ties, viewing diplomacy as infiltration.

Even after the 2015 nuclear deal, his stance blocked normalization. Similarly, Iran’s hardline stance on Israel has drained resources and diplomacy, disconnected from national interests.

Key missteps have weakened Iran's power since the theocracy's inception: from purging the military after the revolution to abandoning arms deals, and taking aggressive anti-Western positions.

The "Look East" strategy, replacing Western ties with China and Russia, has brought limited gains.

These ties emerged from isolation, not strategy. Russia withheld arms and reversed support for Iran’s enrichment rights. China has complied with sanctions and avoided defense ties.

These partnerships reflect weakness, not strength.

The core of the problem

Iran’s political structure is inseparable from the Supreme Leader.

Khamenei has shaped nearly all key decisions for over three decades. Velayat-e Faqih concentrates power in an unelected cleric, undermining accountability.

Why should governance belong to clerics? Democracies allow voters to remove failed leaders. In Iran, the Supreme Leader claims divine legitimacy beyond electoral scrutiny.

The 1989 constitutional revision gave him unchecked power, while the Assembly of Experts is functionally powerless.

Khamenei has deepened internal divisions—between loyalists and critics, and between state-enforced norms (like forced hijab) and citizens who reject them.

The state spends resources policing women and dissent rather than addressing threats. The result: emigration of skilled professionals, unqualified loyalists in office, and decisions made by an isolated circle.

This erodes Iran’s capacity and sovereignty.

A path forward?

Recent gestures in Tehran—nationalistic concerts and reformist figures, recently reappearing on state TV after years of exclusion—don’t address the crisis’s roots. Iran needs internal transformation and rebuilding of national power through institutional change.

Change must come from within—via elite and popular pressure—not foreign intervention, which would prolong the crisis and invite geopolitical rivalry.

One path is sustained pressure compelling Khamenei to step down and transfer power to a transitional authority.

During this interim period, a constituent assembly could draft a democratic constitution. That authority could then oversee a national referendum and free elections.

Institutions that block broad participation—like the Guardian Council—should be dissolved. Only fully open elections, inclusive of all political currents, can restore national sovereignty.

Democratic governance—paired with efforts to rebuild military, economic, and institutional capacity—offers a viable path.

A legitimate, inclusive state can deter threats, foster cohesion, and let Iranians shape their future.

Iran doesn’t need another myth. It needs a transformation grounded in realism, responsibility, and renewed commitment to national power through democratic means.