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ANALYSIS

Khamenei defies Trump pressure, but will he hold the line?

Ali Afshari
Ali Afshari

Analyst of Iranian politics based in the US

Feb 25, 2025, 20:02 GMT+0Updated: 09:51 GMT+0
Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei visits the country's defence industries
Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei visits the country's defence industries

Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei has ruled out talks with the United States despite President Donald Trump’s threat to zero Iranian oil exports, but is Khamenei’s stance final?

Looking from afar, it appears that Khamenei is banking on what he perceives as resilience of the Islamic Republic—the system, as he usually calls it.

If the system can withstand the storm, there may be a chance to negotiate in circumstances less treacherous and toward terms more favorable.

A historical overview could be enlightening.

The 2015 nuclear deal, officially named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was presented as a diplomatic breakthrough by all sides involved. It only came through, however, after heavy sanctions by the United Nations and the US under Barack Obama.

Khamenei reluctantly allowed talks, first secretly then publicly, calling it "heroic flexibility", and eventually nodded through the ensuing agreement, essentially accepting a halt to Iran’s nuclear activities while preserving the nuclear infrastructure.

But how should we read Khamenei's opposition this time? Is he truly and absolutely, as he claims, against negotiating with Trump?

His history of dual positioning suggests otherwise.

Saving the system at all costs

Contrary to the prevailing narrative, Khamenei’s opposition to a potential detente with Washington is not absolute.

He may not authorize talks if he believes sanctions, even tightened ones, are not detrimental to his system’s survival, or if he thinks other world powers could throw him a lifeline.

But what if he sees no such sign of relief on the horizon?

The Islamic Republic is arguably in a weaker position now than it has ever been, both internally and externally, with no clear outlook for a revival of the Resistance Front of armed allies in the region that it all but lost in the past year.

This reality may compel Khamenei to allow talks as much as it could force him not to, since he wants to negotiate from a position of power. In short, the unfavorable circumstances call for negotiations but the terms of the potential agreement forbid it.

It is Catch-22. What is to be done if you perceive the concessions required of you in an agreement as existentially threatening as refusing to negotiate in the first place?

Flexing over the fence

Khamenei’s answer to that question appears to come in two parts, either limited but aggressive confrontations, or, dialogue through intermediaries. The aim is to alter the conditions of negotiation or muddle through Trump’s second term.

Iran’s supreme leader will not hesitate to announce a variation on the theme of heroic flexibility, If circumstances align with his expectations.

If Khamenei were entirely opposed to negotiations, he would have fully withdrawn from the JCPOA and escalated into full confrontation. Instead, he has halted further uranium enrichment and adopted a defensive regional stance to strengthen his bargaining position and shift negotiation conditions in his favor.

Turning to domestic power dynamics, all factions appear to be singing from the Khamenei sheet, rejecting Trump’s proposal for talks.

Even then, the hardline principalists continue to criticize the relatively moderate administration of Masoud Pezeshkian because while the president himself is fully in line, some figures close to him utter out-of-line views from time to time.

The hardliners—and Khamenei himself—reject the moderates’ de-escalation and diplomacy as strategic solutions. They will keep doing so until they hit an impasse or arrive at waters calmer for roundtable.

In their view, hard power, including the now diminished Resistance, is the country’s primary tool in dealing with external pressure.

It is also imperative to national security. The continued attacks on Pezeshkian aim to prevent him from politically capitalizing on the situation and enhancing the moderates’ position within the system.

Khamenei would likely carry on sitting on the fence, ruling out talks with Trump in words but not deeds. Even in words, Iran’s supreme leader has been markedly measured when talking about the US president.

The Supreme Leader knows, better than everybody perhaps, that he may need to change tack at any moment.

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Iran advocates closer ties with Russia as Lavrov visits Tehran

Feb 25, 2025, 18:25 GMT+0

Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian said Tehran is committed to boosting ties with Moscow in a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Tuesday, as both powers weigh how to deal with new US President Donald Trump.

"Iran and Russia have appropriate capacities to strengthen cooperation with each other, and we are determined to strengthen the interactions between Tehran and Moscow," Pezeshkian said.

"Iran and Russia have similar views on regional issues and seek to strengthen their regional and international cooperation", he added.

Moscow was dealt a boost this month as Washington under Trump emphasized the swift ending of the war Ukraine and restoration of bilateral ties.

Tehran, mired in economic malaise, faces a trickier choice dealing with Trump, who has ruled out allowing Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb and said he wants a deal which Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has ruled out.

Pezeshkian also urged for expediting the implementation of agreements, especially a Comprehensive Strategic Agreement between the two countries.

Tehran and Moscow signed a long-term agreement in March 2001 which was initially set for a ten-year term but was extended twice, each time for five years. Despite prior discussions, similar promises to finalize a renewed treaty have remained unfulfilled.

Lavrov, who conveyed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s greetings to Pezeshkian, said: “Iran and Russia have many common interests in continuing effective regional cooperation with each other.”

In a press conference following separate discussions with Lavrov, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi ruled out direct negotiations with the United States over the country’s nuclear program.

"Regarding Iran's nuclear issue, we will move forward and coordinate our positions in cooperation with our friends in Russia and China," Araghchi said.

"Iran's position in the nuclear talks is completely clear, and we will not negotiate under pressure and sanctions. There is no possibility of direct negotiations between us and the US as long as maximum pressure is being applied in this manner," he added.

Tehran’s envoy to Moscow, Kazem Jalali, also said the discussions specifically covered the nuclear issue and joint approaches in the field.

Why is the Russian foreign minister visiting Iran now?

Feb 25, 2025, 13:14 GMT+0
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Tehran has sparked speculation in Iranian media about whether he is carrying a message from Washington or pushing Moscow’s own agenda at Iran’s expense.

Tehran and Moscow say Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, will discuss mutual relations, trade, and economic cooperation, as well as key international issues, including the situation in Syria, during the one-day visit.

The visit follows discussions in Ankara on Monday and comes just a week after his meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh.

Delivering a message from the United States to Iran?

Iranian media, analysts, and the public have closely scrutinized recent visits by high-ranking foreign officials to Tehran, including Lavrov and the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who met with Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei last week. These visits are widely interpreted as potential mediation efforts between Tehran and Washington or as channels for delivering messages from the Trump administration.

A commentary published Tuesday by Iran’s official news agency, IRNA, acknowledged that the purpose of Lavrov’s visit might extend beyond the official agenda. However, it argued that many experts doubt Lavrov is carrying a direct message from the Trump administration. Instead, it suggested that Lavrov might share his assessment of Washington’s approach to Iran and relay Iran’s desired roadmap back to the US in a similar manner.

The commentary also speculated that Lavrov could be conveying Moscow’s own message to Tehran, warning against shifting Iran’s nuclear doctrine or withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as some Iranian ultra-hardliners advocate.

Speaking to the reformist Etemad daily, foreign policy analyst Abdolreza Faraji-Rad cast doubt on the likelihood of Lavrov delivering a direct US message to Tehran.

If such a message were being conveyed, he suggested it might involve Washington offering a temporary reduction in “maximum pressure” sanctions—reimposed by Trump’s executive order on January 20—in exchange for Iran agreeing to direct negotiations over its nuclear program.

Others suggested that Lavrov is simply planning to inform the Islamic Republic about its changing relations with the Trump administration and Ukraine negotiations.

Concerns about Iran being used by Russia as a bargaining chip

Some Iranian media and analysts warned that Iran could be betrayed by Russia and become a bargaining chip in potential negotiations between the Trump and Putin administrations, particularly regarding the Ukraine conflict.

A commentary published Tuesday by Khabar Online, a news outlet close to former conservative Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, compared Lavrov’s recent meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the planned Trump-Putin meeting compared by some to the Yalta Conference of February 1945, which reshaped global geopolitics. The article warned that “Iran is also in danger.”

Khabar Online also quoted former chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, who argued that Iran is merely a bargaining chip in these negotiations. “I am concerned that Iran may be sacrificed for peace [in Ukraine],” he stated.

Reza Taghizadeh, a Glasgow-based Iranian political commentator, echoed similar concerns on X, speculating that “Lavrov's goal in Tehran is to convince the Islamic Republic to surrender its nuclear program and disband the ‘axis of resistance’ in exchange for avoiding an Israeli military attack and blocking [its] oil exports! … Are the Russians securing [concessions from the US over] Ukraine while offering up Iran [in return]?”

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Should he emerge as Germany's leader, the top European economy and trading partner with the largely sanctioned and shunned Islamic Republic could be set to take a stronger tack against Tehran.

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Iran this month repatriated the body of German-Iranian citizen Jamshid Sharmahd after his death in an Iranian prison while awaiting execution.

German-Iranian citizen Jamshid Sharmahd during his trial in Iran
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Sharmahd was convicted of heading a pro-monarchist group accused of a deadly 2008 bombing at a religious center in Shiraz, which killed 14 people - charges he denied.

Late last year, Merz decried Sharmahd's death as a "horrible crime," writing on X: "The trial was a mockery of the international standards for due process of law. The Iranian regime is once again showing its inhuman character."

"The approach of 'quiet diplomacy' with #Iran has failed ... Germany #Iran policy in recent years has been characterized by the idea of a cooperative government in Tehran – this illusion was to be abandoned," he said.

Merz advocated heavier sanctions, downgrading relations and expelling Tehran's ambassador.

EU postpones ministerial discussion on Iran to March

Feb 24, 2025, 15:29 GMT+0

European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday that a planned ministers-only discussion on Iran was postponed due to the absence of key foreign ministers.

“On Iran, we were supposed to have discussions, ministers-only format, regarding Iran today but because very important foreign ministers were missing, so we postponed this,” Kallas said.

“The point was to have ministers-only discussion to get the understanding where we are so that we are able to come out with initiatives and concrete proposals,” she added, confirming that the meeting has been postponed to March.

Last week, Laurence Norman of The Wall Street Journal reported that that European Union foreign ministers we due to meet on Monday for a ministerial discussion focusing on Iran.

In a post on X, Norman said the agenda "will span Tehran’s support for Russia, its nuclear advances, its arrest of European citizens among other issues."

"First @kajakallas move to tighten EU stance on Iran," he added, referring to EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. Norman cited the EU diplomat as saying the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will be one of five key topics discussed.

Will Iran's ultra-hardliners make gains in upcoming local elections?

Feb 24, 2025, 15:07 GMT+0
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Maryam Sinaiee

Ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili and his allies—widely regarded as President Masoud Pezeshkian’s chief rivals—are maneuvering to expand their political influence through upcoming city and village council elections, according to Iranian media.

While Jalili only briefly referenced the importance of these elections in a speech last week, his public appearances and speeches have notably increased in recent months. In these speeches, Jalili emphasized that the development budget allocated to the country’s top cities exceeds the national development budget, pointing to the significance of these local councils.

“It appears that Jalili’s statements should be considered a signal of the [active] participation of him and his supporters in the seventh city council elections,” an article published by Rozan Online read on Saturday.

The publication’s report also argued that these elections could intensify rivalries within the hardliner/ultra-hardliner camp, particularly in cities like Tehran, where Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, a former mayor of the capital, and his supporters still wield some influence in the municipality.

Jalili and his supporters’ plans for the elections on June 19 will not only heighten competition among three factions—led by Jalili, incumbent Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani, and Ghalibaf—but could also lead to new coalitions or deeper divisions within this political faction, Rozan’s piece noted.

Ghalibaf has been relatively supportive of Pezeshkian’s “national unity” government and is often accused by Jalili’s supporters on social media of betraying the “revolutionary cause.”

Jalili has no executive experience. He led Iran’s nuclear negotiations during the presidency of populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and currently represents Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Additionally, he serves on the Expediency Discernment Council (EDC), also by Khamenei’s appointment.

“The Jalili circle has become hyperactive in parliament and on social media in unison with him,” a piece by Khabar Online read – a media outlet linked to former conservative parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani.

The publication speculated on Saturday that securing control over city and village councils could be a stepping stone for Jalili’s presidential ambitions in the next election.

Khabar Online’s report also suggested that if Jalili’s supporters gain a majority in the Tehran City Council, he could position himself as the mayor of the capital, following Ahmadinejad’s footsteps, who later became president.

Jalili, who competed against Pezeshkian in the June 2024 runoff presidential election, does not formally lead any political party. However, he has strong backing from the ultra-hardliner Paydari Party and its allies, including the Iran Morning Front (Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran), a political party established only a year ago. Both parties officially endorsed and campaigned for Jalili in the recent presidential election.

Jalili and his supporters are staunchly opposed to any negotiations with the United States regarding Iran's nuclear program, missile capabilities, and regional influence. They also reject Iran's accession to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conventions, which could help remove Iran from the global money-laundering watchdog’s blacklist.

The ultra-hardliner Paydari Party, a small but influential faction in parliament, has been behind several controversial legislative efforts, including the strict hijab law and the recent attempt to impeach Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati. The Paydari Party and the Iran Morning Front also have a strong presence in key state institutions, including the state-run broadcasting organization (IRIB), where Jalili’s brother, Vahid Jalili, serves as a cultural deputy. In this role, he wields significant influence over IRIB’s policy direction.

The city and village council elections are the only elections in Iran that do not require candidate vetting by the ultra-hardliner Guardian Council, allowing for broader participation than in parliamentary and other elections.

In smaller towns and villages, competition in local government council elections is often driven by ethnic and tribal factors which may bring more voters to the ballot boxes.

However, in major cities like Tehran, where political concerns take precedence, voter turnout could be very low like in last year’s parliamentary elections.