Iran deploys advanced centrifuges in defiance of IAEA resolution

Earlier in the day, Japan's Kyodo News Agency reported the meeting, citing several Iranian diplomatic sources.

The report indicated that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration aims to resolve the nuclear impasse before the inauguration of the next US president, Donald Trump.

According to Baghaei, the upcoming talks with the three European countries are seen as a follow-up to meetings held with them on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

“In this round of talks, which were planned in New York, a range of regional and international issues, including Palestine and Lebanon, as well as nuclear issues, will be discussed.”

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who previously served as Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations and was a member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team for the JCPOA nuclear accord is said to be leading the negotiations.

There is no direct confirmation of scheduled talks from the European sides.

Earlier on Sunday, Iran's state-run ISNA news agency quoted the EU's lead spokesperson for foreign affairs, Peter Stano, as saying that the bloc is in contact with Iran regarding the prospect of resuming the talks. However, there is no independent source confirming Stano's statement.

The outgoing High Representative of the EU Josep Borrell and his team are in contact with Iran, other parties of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and also the United States to keep all communication channels open and maintain the possibility of meaningful nuclear negotiations, he said according to ISNA.

Stano also expressed hope for a swift resumption of nuclear diplomacy with Tehran, according to these reports.

"We hope that nuclear diplomacy can resume soon since a solution to the Iran nuclear issue cannot wait any longer. It will also be conducive to the stabilization of the region," he told the semi-official ISNA. "Diplomacy is the way to find solutions on sensitive issues and we have already reached out to the new President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi." However, this statement, if correct, is not a confirmation of any immediate talks.

Criticizing Tehran’s lack of transparency over its nuclear program, Stano noted, "The EU fully relies on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the agency's report regarding Iran's nuclear trajectory and lack of cooperation is very concerning.” "The EU is committed to a comprehensive political approach based on mutual respect," he added.

On November 21, 2024, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution against Iran over its perceived non-cooperation with international inspections, saying it is not convinced that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. It has been asking questions and seeking clarification on several issues for years. But many remain unresolved.

The IAEA is calling on Iran to urgently improve its cooperation with the agency and provide a comprehensive report on its nuclear activities.

The resolution against Iran may prove a crucial step in building a case for more binding measures. It provides a basis for the parties to the JCPOA to claim Iran is violating its commitments and potentially initiate what is known as the Trigger Mechanism.

Trigger Mechanism is an informal term for a provision under the 2015 deal that allows signatories to reimpose Iran sanctions that were lifted under the agreement.

In 2018, the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and reimposed harsh sanctions on Iran. In response, Iran began violating the deal's nuclear limits, including stockpiling enriched uranium, enriching it to higher purity levels, and installing advanced centrifuges.

Indirect talks between the Biden administration and Iran to revive the deal have been unsuccessful. Despite this, Trump stated during his election campaign in September that a nuclear deal with Iran is necessary to avoid adverse consequences. "We have to make a deal, because the consequences are impossible. We have to make a deal".

“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is a prevailing logic vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, overshadowing political, even humanitarian, sentiments.

Across Tehran, banners urging support for Palestinian and Lebanese war victims have become a common sight. One banner calls on citizens to sponsor displaced Lebanese families. On state TV, women are featured donating their gold and jewelry for Gaza and Lebanon. But this is not the whole story—far from it, in fact.

“These campaigns to support Gaza and Lebanon are sickening. They target people who can’t even afford bread. Money that could help Iranians escape poverty is funneled into Gaza and Lebanon.” This is my friend Safoora, a 38-year-old graphic designer. She jumps in when I ask our rideshare driver what he thinks about the pro-Palestinian billboards. The driver nods in agreement, half-glancing at Safoora in the rear-mirror.

“I agree with every word,” he joins in. “The government pours oil revenues into Gaza and Lebanon while our own people suffer. They wanted a Shiite crescent in the region, but look at what happened to the IRGC commanders and the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah. They spent our money for nothing.”

No reliable data exists on Iranians’ view of regional politics. But anecdotal evidence suggests the views shared by Safoora and Kamran the driver are typical.

Iran’s strategy of backing armed groups against Israel and the United States has not sat well with much of the Iranian population. The discontent is evident in everyday conversations. And it’s cried out in almost every collective act of protest in recent years: “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, (I give) my life for Iran”.

The laws of the Islamic Republic criminalize travel to Israel or expressing support for it. Iranian athletes are barred from competing against Israelis in international events.

Until recently, even using the word “Israel” in publications (instead of the “Zionist regime”) could mean serious trouble. Then there's the annual, state-sponsored Quds Day rally in solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

This one-sided approach has alienated many Iranians, who increasingly link the country’s economic woes to its regional policies.

Apathy and resentment are prevalent. Those feeling differently—those sympathetic to Palestinians and critical of Israel— often keep quiet to avoid “pro-regime” and “apologist” labels.

“The regime has monopolized and corrupted the Palestinian issue,” says Roya, a 34-year old activist from Iran’s Kurdish region. “It’s almost impossible to express support for Palestinians when the public is so hostile or indifferent at best."

"People who oppose Israel’s killing of civilians feel trapped. We want to protest these atrocities, but we don’t want to be associated with the regime and its propaganda,” she added.

Last month, more than 400 Iranian academics, writers, and activists inside and outside Iran signed a letter condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza.

The letter sparked backlash on social media. The signatories were called hypocrites for not criticizing the Islamic Republic equally. They responded that Iran’s stance was irrelevant to their concern about what they called genocide.

“Why do they condemn Israel but not Hamas? Why are they not so vocal when the regime executes protesters?” said Alireza, 29, works in a tech-support company. He believes it’s “stupid at best” to be concerned about Palestinians. “We have enough injustice to deal with at home,” he added.

His coworker, Babak, snaps at him. “So I’m stupid if I’m mad about kids being killed by Israel?” He turns to me, “I often think we’re blinded by our hatred for the Islamic Republic. We happily ignore or condone any crime if we think it’s somehow against our government.”

The debate surrounding Israel and Palestine is a microcosm of Iran’s internal struggles. For many Iranians, animus toward the Islamic Republic overshadows everything, including humanitarian sentiments. Life is tough here—too tough, often, for empathy to get the better of cynicism.

Justifying his statement, Pezeshkian said, "With the leadership of Khamenei and the economic potential of our country, Iran does not deserve to lag behind its neighboring countries."

However, Iran has a bitter history of inviting foreign experts and economists to solve Iran's problems since the early 1910s.

Five years after Iran's 1905 Constitutional Revolution, the country's first parliament, determined to establish a Western-oriented democratic civil society in what was then known internationally as Persia, persuaded Mohammad Ali Shah—a ruler heavily influenced by Russia—to invite an economic adviser from the United States. Unlike Russia and Great Britain, the US had no political ambitions in Iran and showed no interest in exploiting its resources.

The 1905 revolutionaries had forced the Qajar Dynasty monarch Mozaffar ad-Din Shah to agree to the election of a parliament (Majles) and the opening up of a relatively free press as well as bringing about other reforms. But the king died within a few months and was replaced by Mohammad Ali Shah.

At the time, the United States was so uninvolved in regional ambitions that it initially declined Iran's request. However, under persistent pressure from the Iranians, the US government recommended William Morgan Shuster—a lawyer, civil servant, and publisher—who was ultimately appointed by the Iranian parliament as the Treasurer-General of Persia. Shuster served in this role from May to December 1911.

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Shuster made every effort to stabilize Iran's chaotic and fragile economy, which had been severely impacted by the Qajar Shahs' debts to Imperial Russia and Great Britain. These two powers had effectively divided Iran into spheres of influence under the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. However, Shuster’s reforms, which sought to restore financial independence, challenged the authority of both Russia and Britain. In response, their agents in Iran created obstacles for him, and Russian forces subsequently occupied parts of northern Iran. They later accused Shuster of deploying Iranian gendarmes to collect taxes from people within the Russian-occupied territories.

Under mounting pressure from Russia and Britain, Shuster was ultimately forced to resign. He returned to the United States, where he wrote The Strangling of Persia, a book detailing the extensive influence and interference of Britain and Russia in Iran.

The Iranian government also appointed US-educated British lawyer and economist Arthur Millspaugh as its financial adviser, first from 1922 to 1927 and again from 1942 to 1945, to reform the country’s financial system. While his first tenure was relatively successful, his second was deemed a complete failure. The Iranian government attributed this failure to Millspaugh's "arrogance," though many observers pointed to factional infighting, political instability, and obstruction by opposition groups as key factors.

The factors mentioned—factional disputes, economic and political instability, obstructions by political rivals, and a deep-rooted xenophobia exacerbated under the Islamic Republic’s anti-West ideology—persist in modern Iran. Although 80 percent of the economy is controlled by the state or entities affiliated with the Islamic Republic’s establishment, factions thrive among these privileged groups ranging from clerics to the IRGC and influential families. Reforming the economy is hard to imagine in this non-competitive, non-transparent system.

Starting in the 1950s and continuing until the 1979 revolution, American and other international experts, advisors, and engineering specialists flocked to Iran to support the ambitious economic and industrial development spearheaded by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. By the 1970s, Iran was emerging as a regional industrial power and a major oil exporter.

In the unlikely event that Pezeshkian secures approval to hire international advisers, the challenges inherent in the Islamic Republic's economic and political system are likely to hinder their work.

The rabbi, identified by the Israeli government as Zvi Kogan, was a Chabad emissary who may have been followed by the Iranian intelligence, according to Israeli media reports.

The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office confirmed that the Mossad intelligence service is investigating Kogan's disappearance on Thursday.

The office said the incident is being treated as terrorism. A dual Israeli-Moldovan national, Kogan has been part of the Abu Dhabi Chabad chapter since Israel normalized its relations with the United Arab Emirates in late 2020.

Walla News, citing Israeli officials, said he has been abducted in Dubai. Ynet also cited security sources as saying that the rabbi was likely abducted from the kosher supermarket he managed in Dubai.

Israel's Channel 11 reported that the rabbi has been kidnapped by a cell directed by Iran, which apparently managed to escape to Turkey. The Ynet report also confirmed that the perpetrators are believed to have fled to Turkey.

Senior Israeli officials told Walla News that the focus of investigations was "a terrorist squad of Uzbek origin that operated in Dubai on behalf of Iran and allegedly carried out the abduction and then fled to Turkey."

The Mossad and the Israeli National Security Council say Israel's intelligence indicated "he may have been under surveillance by terrorist elements," the Walla report added.

While Israel has not yet accused Iran of involvement in the abduction, Western officials believe Tehran runs intelligence operations in the UAE and keeps tabs on the hundreds of thousands of Iranians living across the country, according to the Associated Press.

In one of the most recent cases in 2020, German-Iranian citizen Jamshid Sharmahd was abducted by Iranian agents from his hotel in Dubai while on a layover. He was later transferred to Iran and sentenced to death.

On 5 November 2024, a spokesman for the Iranian judiciary said Sharmahd died in custody on October 28 before he could be executed.

Kogan's abduction comes as Iran has been threatening to retaliate against Israel over the October 26 air strikes, which according to Israeli and US officials, knocked out Iran's last three Russian-provided S-300 air defense missile systems and left the country "naked".

Q: What is the IAEA resolution against Iran about?

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says it is not convinced that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. It has been asking questions and seeking clarification on several issues for years. But many remain unresolved.

On November 21, 2024, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on Iran to urgently improve its cooperation with the agency and provide a comprehensive report on its nuclear activities.

The resolution was proposed by the US, UK, France, and Germany. It passed by 19 votes in favor (of 34). China, Russia, and Burkina Faso voted against and 12 countries abstained.

Q: Is the resolution binding?

No. IAEA resolutions are not legally binding in the way that treaties or UN Security Council resolutions are. However, they are significant politically, signalling a shift in international attitudes and an intent to take further action.

The resolution against Iran may prove a crucial step in building a case for more binding measures. It provides a basis for the parties to the 2015 nuclear deal - Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA - to claim Iran is violating its commitments and potentially initiate what is known as the Trigger Mechanism.

Q: What is the Trigger Mechanism?

Trigger Mechanism is an informal term for a provision under the 2015 deal that allows signatories to reimpose Iran sanctions that were lifted under the agreement.

Any party can report alleged non-compliance to the Joint Commission, consisting of all current parties to the deal - which oversees the agreement. If the issue isn’t resolved within 35 days, the complaining party can notify the UN Security Council, effectively triggering a process that could result in snapback sanctions

Q: What is snapback?

Snapback refers to the concept that UN sanctions on Iran can be restored automatically.

The Security Council does not have to vote on reimposing sanctions. Once Iran’s case is referred to there, the sanctions that were lifted under the JCPOA will snap back into place in 30 days unless the council votes to continue lifting sanctions.

Q: Who can start this process?

Any party to the 2015 deal can allege that Iran is non-compliant and take their case to the Joint Commission.

The countries that can do so are France, Germany, UK, Russia and China. The United States was also a signatory to the JCPOA, but unilaterally withdrew in 2018 during President Donald Trump's first term.

Q: Who decides if Iran is compliant or not?

The IAEA is tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities and ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the JCPOA. Reports from the IAEA are critical in assessing whether Iran is fulfilling its obligations.

The JCPOA signatories assess Iran’s activities based on IAEA findings and their own intelligence inputs.

In short, the IAEA provides the technical foundation for judgments, but political decisions depend on consensus, or lack thereof, among JCPOA signatories.

Q: Has the Trigger Mechanism been used before?

Yes and no. In January 2020, France, and Germany and the UK (E3) initiated the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, the process that can lead to the Trigger Mechanism, after Iran moved away from some of its JCPoA commitments in response to the Trump administration withdrawing from the deal.

The E3 did not notify the UN Security Council, however, saying that their aim was to convince Iran to respect its obligations, not to impose snapback sanctions.