The Mahsa Movement, despite its achievements and shortcomings, prompts a critical examination of the regime’s resilience. It is essential to understand why a transition to a new political system has not occurred, given the movement’s strong intentions and broad domestic and international support. The persistence of authoritarian regimes like Iran's and their ability to maintain power has become a key topic of discussion among political experts and activists in recent decades.
Understanding the new generation of authoritarians
To grasp the Islamic Republic’s durability, it is essential to understand the new generation of authoritarian leaders and regimes.
Emerging in the latter half of the 20th century, these regimes differ markedly from classic dictatorships, totalitarian states, and monarchies. They lack overtly undemocratic structures but do not operate with the transparency and popular consent of genuine democracies. Many regimes worldwide—spanning Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East—fall somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. This is why it should come as no surprise that both Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, the previous and current leaders of the Islamic Republic, despite their fundamentalist, totalitarian discourse, often speak highly of democracy in their speeches.
These regimes adopt techniques and institutions from both democratic and authoritarian systems to consolidate power. By maintaining a veneer of legitimacy through engineered elections and limited power rotation among loyal elites, they present a facade of democracy. In Iran, this facade fosters some hope for reform while discouraging outright revolution. Understanding this arrangement is crucial when discussing how to challenge and confront such regimes.
The leaders’ strategies in this type of states range from overt violence, such as repression, imprisonment, and torture, to more subtle measures like election manipulation, media propaganda, and the distribution of political and economic favors.
This is why, in the Islamic Republic, we see both the killing of 1,500 people within a week during the 2019 protest crackdown and, five years later, a presidential election billed as a reformist move by the top ruler. It is a striking and paradoxical blend of state-managed ballot boxes and batons versus the society.
Political engineering: Crafting legitimacy
A key factor in the survival of these political systems is their use of clientelism to cultivate loyalist forces. This strategy has evolved from simply offering money or government positions to providing economic privileges, licenses, and various favors. In such a patrimonial system, the state machinery and public resources are seen as the ruler’s personal assets used to manage and control society.
In this environment, informal relationships often override formal laws and regulations, shaping political norms and behaviors. This leads to a persistent absence of the rule of law and reinforces authoritarianism, where economic corruption and political repression become essential for the regime's survival.
In modern authoritarian regimes, loyalist forces have become more complex and insidious. They often blend into society, masquerading as ordinary citizens, dissidents, or protesters, which undermines efforts to mobilize societal pressure and complicates political opposition.
The Islamic Republic: A unique system
After a tumultuous decade in the 1980s, the Islamic Republic has spent the following decades institutionalizing a modern authoritarian Islamic state. It has skillfully built a vast network of loyalist forces across political, social, and economic spheres.
This network is maintained through hundreds of religious organizations, cultural foundations, paramilitary groups, state institutions, and other entities. Loyalist forces fall into two categories: those with formal roles, such as military personnel and clerics, and those with covert functions, such as pro-government activists and economic oligarchs. These forces support the regime by suppressing protests during unrest and advancing government interests during quieter periods, often at the expense of independent groups.
Sowing division through loyalist groups
The Islamic Republic has long utilized loyalist groups to create societal divisions. Even during reformist periods, such as President Mohammad Khatami’s tenure (1997-2005), the regime expanded its network of loyalist civil society groups, including religious, cultural, and charitable NGOs. Financially and politically dependent on the government, these groups have often opposed protest tactics and sought to undermine genuine opposition efforts. This "divide and rule" strategy has been a cornerstone of the regime’s survival.
For example, during recent parliamentary and presidential elections, opposition calls for boycotts were actively countered by regime-aligned ‘reformists’ and their affiliates. Despite these efforts, loyalists failed to meet the regime’s goals, with voter turnout in all elections over the past five years remaining below 50 percent.
Loyalist groups within religious and ideological institutions—such as Islamic seminaries, mosques, and religious organizations—aid the regime in maintaining ideological control over society. Additionally, economic organizations play a key role in sustaining loyalty by providing financial and professional rewards to align activists with government interests.
Investment in military and bureaucracy
Understanding the complex government-society structure raises a critical question: How do loyalist forces contribute to the regime's preservation?
The Islamic Republic’s survival relies heavily on its military and security apparatus, which protect the regime, and the economic dependence of millions of Iranians on state wages and benefits. This economic entanglement severely hampers revolutionary efforts and limits opposition support.
Dr. Abel Escriba-Folch, a political scientist at Pompeu Fabra University, highlighted in an interview with Iran International that Iran’s military personnel make up over 2.2% of the workforce, significantly higher than the global average of 0.8%. This underscores the regime’s heavy reliance on its security apparatus for societal control.
While the military plays a crucial role, the state machinery is highly effective in sustaining authoritarianism. Escriba-Folch notes that the state's power is a formidable tool of authoritarianism, with government institutions excelling in tasks such as coercing rivals, extracting revenue, managing citizen registration, and fostering dependency. This effectiveness enhances the durability of authoritarianism in ways unmatched by other institutions.
The professor explains that the dependence of a large segment of society on state-provided salaries, financial aid, and other benefits diminishes their motivation and capacity to challenge the state.
Preventive and Reactive Repression
Regime preservation and repression extend beyond periods of unrest. The Islamic Republic employs its network of religious, administrative, political, cultural, and economic institutions to sustain its legitimacy and effectiveness.
In this area, Dr. Escriba-Folch distinguishes between preventive repression, which aims to thwart opposition organization, and reactive repression, which addresses protests after they occur. Both forms of repression involve the state’s bureaucratic apparatus and security machinery.
Government employees and the large bureaucracy act as tools of preventive repression by maintaining the network of loyalists.
Escriba-Folch highlights that digital technologies have enhanced the state bureaucracy’s ability to monitor and control the population, further entrenching its power. The regime uses extensive administrative systems and advanced communication technologies to oversee various aspects of citizens' lives, from salaries and assets to daily transactions and cultural activities, aiming to adjust these elements to ensure societal compliance.
The trigger for change
Professor Francesco Cavatorta of Laval University refers to the role of crises, such as the death of a leader, in shaping transition agreements in some Latin American countries or leading to regime changes in others.
However, when discussing the potential death of a dictator in Iran, Cavatorta points out that the Islamic Republic has already navigated the death of its leader once before. He remarks, "I am confident that the Iranian regime believes that since we’ve managed this situation once before, we can overcome it again [the death of Khamenei]."
Over the past 35 years, however, both the Islamic government and Iranian society have undergone significant changes. The regime has lost much of its legitimacy, while the population has experienced the power of protest.
Winning over loyalists: A path to change
On the second anniversary of Mahsa-Jina Amini’s death, which sparked the 2022 protests, opposition groups must address the segment of society dependent on the government—about 8 million people, or 10% of the population.
Dr. Escriba-Folch argues that as the government’s administrative and military apparatus grows, increasing economic dependence on the state weakens the public’s willingness to challenge it. This dependence stifles revolutionary momentum and complicates organizing opposition.
Professor Cavatorta suggests that real political change in authoritarian regimes occurs when moderates from both the regime and opposition engage in dialogue. He emphasizes the importance of prominent figures and civil leaders in shaping transition agreements. However, the mass exile of opposition figures and intellectuals in recent decades complicates this process, making it harder to bridge the divide.
Whether through violent revolution or peaceful reform, the entrenched network of loyalist forces, clientelism, and economic dependence presents substantial challenges to those seeking change. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for devising effective strategies to confront and overcome the regime’s entrenched power.
