Iran's Rouhani Talks About The Day After Khamenei's Death

Ezzatollah Zarghami disclosed that “a budget of 15,000 billion rials (equivalent to 30 million USD) was earmarked for the development of the cultural heritage ministry, with a portion specifically designated for the restoration of historical and cultural monuments. However, due to the challenges faced by the country, the budget has not been disbursed to the ministry.”

The minister did not elaborate on the nature of the challenges but expressed hope that the funds would be provided later.

The situation is exacerbated by a broader historical trend since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which has seen a nonchalant approach towards pre-Islamic relics. Despite Iran's profound historical legacy, the present regime has not fully embraced its rich heritage, even though the country once presided over the world's largest empire.

Previous instances, such as the announcement in September 2020 by then Minister Ali Asghar Mounesan of a meager annual budget of 50 million rials (approximately 100 USD) for the management of Persepolis, reflect a systemic issue in adequately allocating funds for the preservation of cultural treasures.

Despite warnings from cultural heritage experts, the inauguration of the Chamshir Dam in the Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province on July 17 proceeded. Archaeologists predict that the impoundment of the dam will result in the loss of at least 140 historical monuments in the region, underscoring the destructive consequences of inadequate attention and funding for Iran's cultural heritage.

In May, the government announced plans to auction off some of the country's most treasured sites including Rayen Castle as the country's heritage risks disappearing amidst a government more concerned with its nuclear and military might than its ancient history. 

Customs statistics reveal a notable increase in the export of Iranian dairy products during the first seven months of this year compared to the same period last year. While this initially appears as positive news, the underlying reality paints a more complex picture.

Contrary to a surge in production, the surge in dairy exports is attributed to a surplus of raw milk. The primary driver behind the surplus, however, is not an excessive production beyond consumption needs but rather a significant decline in the purchasing power of the Iranian people, for whom dairy products are becoming increasingly out of reach.

Reza Bakeri, the secretary of the Iranian Dairy Processing Industries Association, commented on the development, noting that “the per capita consumption of dairy products in Iranian society has dwindled due to the diminished purchasing power of the population, resulting in a surplus of raw milk.”

Adding to the economic woes, the inflation rate in the past Iranian month reached its highest point in two years. The government, grappling with substantial budget deficits, has resorted to printing more money, exacerbating the challenges faced by the Iranian economy.

The trend began last year, when Iran’s health ministry announced that the average consumption of milk and dairy products had decreased about 30 percent in the last two years due to rising food prices and inflation.

Despite having the biggest dairy products factory in the Middle East, Iran has a per capita consumption of about 60 to 80 kilograms a year, that is about half of the global average.

The Iranian currency has experienced a significant devaluation, losing its value by 12-fold since 2018, a period marked by the US withdrawal from the JCPOA nuclear accord and the imposition of sanctions.

The House Committee on Education and the Workforce announced on November 16 that the New Jersey-based Princeton University is the subject of an investigation over the role of its controversial academic Mousavian, a former Iranian regime ambassador to Germany.

The twelve Republican lawmakers wrote: “During Mousavian’s tenure at Princeton, one of its students, Xiyue Wang, was held hostage in Iran. Given Mousavian’s experience as a former high-ranking official with the government of Iran, did Princeton ask Mousavian to assist in any way for Xiyue Wang’s release? Did Mousavian offer to use his contacts to try to free Xiyue Wang?”

The congressional representatives requested that Princeton University President Christopher L. Eisgruber answer their questions about Mousavian’s alleged failure to aid the Chinese-American scholar Wang.

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Wang told Iran International that “Princeton did not use its leverage, Mousavian, to get me out and it is not using its leverage to get Elizabeth Tsurkov out.”

Tsurkov,a Russian-Israeli PhD student at Princeton University, was kidnapped by the pro-Iran regime militia Kata'ib Hezbollah in March, 2023 in Iraq.

“Based on my understanding that Mousavian did not help me I would guess he is not working to help Tsurkov, “added Wang, who was imprisoned in Iran between August, 2016 and December 2019.

He and his wife, Hua Qu, sued Princeton University in 2021. Wang and his wife claimed they suffered “severe personal injuries and other irreparable harm, with respect to Princeton’s “reckless, willful, wanton, and grossly negligent acts.”

Wang and Qu settled the lawsuit in September. The elements of the settlement have not been made public. The 45 page civil suit against Princeton, which includes 16 mentions of Mousavian, can be read here.

In his first interview with Iran International, the embattled Princeton academic Mousavian said about Wang’s accusations that “Such claims are because they do not understand Iran. It is true that I was the former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiation team and a friend of the then Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during my service at the Iranian foreign ministry. “

Mousavian added, “However, neither Rouhani as the then president, nor Zarif as the then foreign minister had no power, influence and authority to intervene in Wang’s case. In 2009, an Iranian court sentenced the brother of President Hassan Rouhani, Hossein Fereydoun, to five years in prison.”

Wang countered that “The problem is not really whether Zarif or Rouhani could help. The problem is Mousavian decided he was not going to do anything. Iranian intelligence first confiscated my passport. And 18 days later they arrested me. During this time , I asked Princeton to ask Mousavian to help. And Mousavian decided not to do anything. When you have a person with that level of connections in your institution, you would expect he would act.”

When Iran International first asked Mousavian about the two Princeton students who were kidnapped, the former ambassador said, “I don’t know the students, but I believe any kidnapping, assassination and terror by anyone, anywhere and for any reason is a clear violation of international rules and regulations.”

Wang’s lawsuit stated, “Since joining Princeton in 2009, Mr. Mousavian has written many articles and made many media appearances where he has advocated in favor of the United States allowing Iran to obtain nuclear capabilities. Mr. Mousavian is understood to be a strong and avid supporter of the current Iranian terrorist regime. Mr. Mousavian frequently published pro-regime articles throughout Mr. Wang’s imprisonment in Evin Prison.”

Wang said, “Princeton knew I was held as a hostage as a bargaining chip and yet they were allowing Mousavian to use Princeton to promote the Iranian regime’s interests in the US, Iran and around the world.”

He asked “Why is Mousavian allowed to use his Princeton byline to criticize the US while I am in jail? Princeton, at the level of the university, is in the forefront of the pro-Iran engagement policy. Princeton’s pro-Iran engagement is not working.” He cited the case of Tsurkov, noting “When you have a student get arrested again in the span of a few years that says something.”

Wang said he was “glad” the congressional committee is investigating Princeton and Mousavian, adding they are “asking Princeton some questions that it really needs to answer. Mousavian is representing the Iranian regime unofficially. This is not academic freedom but harboring an agent. Why is Princeton giving the Iranian regime a prestigious platform for the Iranian regime’s interests? Princeton needs to come clean.”

Numerous Iran International press queries to Princeton University went unanswered.

Haeri, who has expressed criticisms against the leadership of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, took to his Telegram channel to inform followers that he appeared before the Special Clerical Court on Saturday, receiving a three-year prison sentence.

The charges against Haeri Shirazi include "spreading falsehoods against Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic" resulting in a two-year imprisonment and a fine of 150 million rials (approximately 300 dollars). Additionally, he is accused of "engaging in propaganda against the system," leading to another one-year prison term.

The Special Clerical Court also imposed restrictions on Haeri, preventing him from participating in online activities for three years and blocking his Telegram channel, deeming it an "instrument of committing a crime."

Shahabeddin Haeri Shirazi is the son of Mohiyeddin Haeri Shirazi, a cleric who held the position of Representative of the Supreme Leader in Fars Province and Friday Prayer Imam of Shiraz for 27 years, appointed first by Ruhollah Khomeini and later by Ali Khamenei.

During some years of his father's leadership, Shahabeddin took on the role of the representative and Friday Prayer Imam in Shiraz. However, in recent years, he has been critical of the role of Ruhollah Khomeini in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War and has voiced concerns about the governance style of Ali Khamenei.

The closure, largely overlooked by Iranian media and officials, underscored the regime's struggle to propagate its ideological messaging among Iranians who had emigrated to avoid exposure to such totalitarian and biased content.

Saeed Fanian, a former manager of Jam-e Jam, contends that the channel's shutdown highlights the breakdown of the state television organization's monopoly on TV broadcasting. He specifically pointed the finger at Vahid Jalili, the deputy chairman of IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), for lacking the necessary expertise to lead the channel.

Fanian also criticized IRIB Chief Peyman Jebelli for failing to fulfil promises to restore the broadcaster's credibility. According to Fanian, a successful television program should challenge authorities and convince the audience of its fairness -- elements he believes the state TV failed to achieve.

Fanian, an Iranian academic headed IRIB's newsroom from 1988 to 1994 and the Jam-e Jam channel from 2003 to 2009. He believes that the state television launched Jam-e Jam to confront the influence of foreign-based satellite television channels which were new in the Iranian media landscape in the 1990s.

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However, with the proliferation of more foreign-based professional Persian networks after 2009, the channel lost its appeal for expatriates, who appreciated the transparent political slant of the foreign-based networks. The viewership of Jam-e Jam's three channels for Europe, US and Australia began to drop and during the past years only one of the three channels were beaming to Europe and parts of the United States. However, even Iranian officials admitted that very few Iranian expats tuned to Jam-e Jam for news or entertainment.

Toward the end of its lifetime as hardliners at home pushed their radical cultural policies, the channel stopped broadcasting Iranian music which was more or less the only interesting program on Jam-e Jam after 2009. On the other hand, the channel did not have anything to offer to Iranians who became increasingly politically minded after the disputed presidential election in 2009 and particularly with the start of major protest demonstrations in 2017. There was no trace of the protests and dissent in general on the channel whatsoever.

It was around the same time that major foreign-based channels including Iran International, BBC Persian and Manoto TV began to offer more programming on Iran's domestic politics and hot issues such as human rights violations in Iran. They catered to the needs of Iranians inside and outside of the country for accurate and unbiased information about events in the country.

In his interview, Fanian admitted that Jam-e Jam was somewhat successful before these channels appeared on the Iranian media landscape. While he still believes that Jam-e Jam's winning edge toward the end of its activity was broadcasting Iranian TV sitcoms, a recent report on Kahabr Online website indicates that the state TV lost its edge as online platforms in Iran started to produce their own series with less radical censorship. 

A study cited by Khabar Online reveals that despite the state TV's monopoly on broadcasting and its extension of censorship to video-on-demand (VOD) services, TV series produced by the state were significantly less successful than those offered by VOD platforms. Notably, even though state TV provided its content for free, VOD series such as "Fatal Wound" and "Return" had nearly double the viewership of all state TV series combined. Another example is the comedy series "How Many Springs There Are in A Lifetime," which has maintained successful viewership on VOD platforms for over five months.

The decline in viewership extends to both news programs and entertainment shows on state TV and its Jam-e Jam channel, losing audiences to online platforms within Iran and foreign-based satellite television channels. Polls conducted domestically and internationally corroborate the substantial drop in state TV viewership. As a result, the government may find it increasingly difficult to justify investing funds in a propaganda machine that has lost its efficacy.