Large Taliban Delegation Visits Tehran To Strengthen Ties

The Coordination Council of Iranian Teachers' Trade Associations declared on Sunday that the trial begins on January 10 in the second branch of the Revolutionary Court in Shahr-e Rey.

The charges against him are "participation and collusion in committing a crime against domestic/foreign security".

Habibi, known for his involvement in cultural and educational activism, was detained in April by Ministry of Intelligence officers. He was released more than a month later after posting bail from Evin Prison's Ward 209.

The chemical attacks on girls' schools began in November 2022, affecting hundreds of schools and thousands of students.

In the initial months, the Islamic Republic denied the chemical attacks on schools. Later, they downplayed the incidents, shifting blame onto the students for the poisonings. Simultaneously, there was an increase in pressure on the media and civil activists to curtail information dissemination on the matter.

Her death was confirmed by one of her close associates and was attributed to a heart attack that occurred while she was sleeping.

Keeping the relationship less public than his first marriage to Seddigheh Mazaheril, who passed away in 2016, the name of Jannati's second wife was kept under wraps.

In 2018, Ali Jannati, Ahmad Jannati's son and a former minister during the Hassan Rouhani administration, announced his father's remarriage, citing his father's desire to combat “loneliness.”

At 97 years of age, Jannati is widely recognized for his unwavering opposition to reform initiatives within Iran.

The centenarian cleric holds the distinction of being the oldest official in Iran, and his remarkable longevity in both life and politics often becomes the subject of humor.

Social media users have playfully teased Jannati, humorously speculating about how many wives he might outlive before his own death.

Jannati's steadfast loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei positions him among the most enduring and influential politicians in Iran, almost acting as a proxy for Khamenei, enabling the Supreme Leader to distance himself from the responsibility of disqualifying election candidates he opposes.

On July 19, Jannati was reinstated as the Secretary of the Guardian Council, prompting discussions about his continued ability to maintain his career for yet another year after serving in the same role for an impressive 31-year duration.

As lawmakers are reviewing the country’s Seventh Development Plan, small amendments of the new plan are revealing nuances in the regime’s long-term policy orientations. 

The administration of President Ebrahim Raisi submitted its Development Plan to the parliament last month. After lawmakers refused to approve the initial proposed draft, apparently for being too general and vague, the administration practically extended its expired development plan for the third time since 2021 with a few amendments and called it a new plan. The old document, the 6th Development Plan, was to be implemented between 2016 and 2021, but many parts of it have remained untouched as the government lacked the appropriate resources due to a catalogue of foreign policy and economic problems. 

Through amendments to the roadmap, which works as a compass for all the state bodies, the administration seeks to de-nationalize the oil industry to cover for its debts and increase even more control over the private sector, already a tiny portion of Iran’s economy. More than 80 percent of Iran's economy is controlled by the clerical regime, including the Revolutionary Guard, leaving little room for real businessmen or private companies to flourish. However, the amendment on the foreign policy was not included in Raisi’s proposed draft and was added by the parliament. 

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According to an article on the general policies of the Seventh Development Plan "for active engagement in official and public diplomacy, the country's executive institutions (with the exception of the armed forces, the Ministry of Intelligence, and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran) are required to carry out all their actions in the field of foreign relations in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” 

Coordination with the Foreign Ministry is not new but one somewhat peculiar addendum is the exemption of the three bodies from the need to coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for conducting foreign relations. 

The general policies for development plans are issued by Iran’s ruler Ali Khamenei and then the administration devises executive plans to actualize Khamenei’s decree. The parliament is then tasked with checking the details to see if the plans are consistent with the Supreme Leader’s orders and the constitution. The end result still needs final approval from the Guardian Council, a Khamenei-appointed and constitutionally mandated 12-member council that has a veto power over legislation passed by the parliament.

Although the Foreign Ministry and the Intelligence Ministry, as well as the country’s nuclear agency are legally part of the administration, Khamenei has direct oversight on their work. He is also the chief commander of the armed forces, which itself is spread through several military bodies such as the traditional army and the Revolutionary Guards. All these bodies are ultimately ruled by the Supreme Leader, therefore envisioning separate autonomy for foreign relations can be aimed at diversifying the regime’s official stance regarding global developments. 

Faraz Daily, a website not directly controlled by the government, says the move will “weaken” the foreign ministry. “The change that the parliament has made in Article 100, exempting three important institutions from coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can potentially lead to chaos in foreign policy,” Faraz Daily said on Sunday. 

Parallel organizations are not something new in Iran’s politics, already having several intelligence institutions, but parallel foreign relations bodies can help Iran keep its hawkish anti-Western stance without strategic retreats while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy with the world. This new shift in the regime’s foreign policy is in line with Khamenei’s dictum that “diplomacy and battleground” are two complementary things which do not negate each other. 

Despite her current house arrest, Rahnavard reiterated her call for an end to compulsory hijab, while drawing parallels between 16-year-old Geravand's death and the deaths of other civilians during nationwide protests last year.

She criticized the Iranian regime, stating "The rulers of Iran, delusionally, see the consolidation of their power in the guise of a few pieces of cloth and a law called compulsory hijab … Each time, they attribute the deaths of these girls to physiological disorders, syncope, underlying illnesses, or suicide.”

Armita Geravand's death last month after enduring a head injury allegedly inflicted by the Islamic Republic's morality police, has drawn significant attention. It echoed the death of Mahsa Amini whose death triggered the nationwide protests which rocked Iran last year. The regime never accepted responsibility for her death.

Pro-regime Kayhan blamed Rahnavard for repeating critical news channels that have reported outside the regime's strict censorship, citing Iran International among them. Earlier this year, threats from regime security forced Iran International to temporarily relocate its London offices to the US.

Iranian officials have also blocked the Internet and restricted access to websites to deny the population news and information.

Kayhan operates under the editorial guidance of Hossein Shariatmadari, a staunch hardliner who enjoys the trust of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He was personally appointed to oversee the newspaper—a publication widely regarded as one of the regime's most uncompromising media outlets.

He denied it was part of a nationwide "purge" to rid the system of anyone voicing dissent and said under a new program teachers can be recruited without the need for an examination.

Reza Morad Sahraei had previously disclosed that nearly 20,000 school administrators had been replaced this year to "bring about transformations in schools" as the new academic year began. However, he now describes the changes and reassignments as "routine" occurrences that take place every year.

In a conversation with ILNA news agency, he dismissed allegations of "purging" certain administrators, claiming that some are retiring while others are being replaced by new personnel.

The development comes as Jalal Mahmoudzadeh, a Sunni member of the Iranian Parliament, criticized the "purging" by the government. He asserted that in less than five months, 15,000 to 20,000 school administrators had been removed from their positions due to "political and ideological reasons," leaving many children without adequate teaching resources.

Iran has been grappling with a teacher shortage since the beginning of the new academic year. Members of parliament have raised concerns about empty classrooms. Iranian media outlets have reported cases of parents stepping in as temporary educators. A parliamentary education committee member claimed that 100,000 classrooms in Iranian schools are currently without a teacher.

Regarding the extent of the teacher shortage, various figures have emerged in the past few weeks, ranging from 200,000 to 260,000 vacant positions.